We now have a copy of the final injunction order entered in the Lancaster County challenge to Virginia’s new “assault firearm” and magazine ban. I will embed a copy of the order below so readers can review the exact language for themselves.
The important point is that the order appears to follow the same basic structure as the court’s earlier ruling. It grants preliminary injunctive relief, but it does so by enjoining the defendant in the case: Colonel Jeffrey S. Katz, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Virginia State Police, along with his successors, officers, agents, servants, and employees.
That is a significant victory. But it is still important not to overread the impact of this first step.
The order does not appear to be written as a universal injunction against every possible enforcement actor in Virginia. It does not expressly enjoin every Commonwealth’s Attorney, every local law-enforcement agency, every locality, or every possible civil-enforcement theory. Instead, it restrains the named defendant and those legally acting through him.
Why this matters
An injunction against the Superintendent of the Virginia State Police can have major statewide practical effect because the Virginia State Police administer the firearm background-check process. If the State Police cannot enforce the challenged provisions through that process, that is enormously important for purchasers and FFLs across the Commonwealth.
But that is not the same thing as saying every possible legal issue has been resolved.
The order enjoins enforcement of several listed provisions, including the new “assault firearm” restrictions, related disqualification provisions, certain public-carry provisions incorporating the amended definition (which had already been put on hold for a year), and related forfeiture provisions. It also provides that the prior versions of the definition of “assault firearm” and the public-carry statute remain in effect during the pendency of the preliminary injunction.
The order is effective from its entry date, June 30, 2026, until December 31, 2026, unless it is dissolved, stayed, modified, or extended by the court or another court of competent jurisdiction. The court also denied the defendant’s oral motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal.
For FFLs and purchasers, the practical takeaway is this: the order is very helpful and gives us great hope that this unconstitutional law will ultimately be struck down in its entirety. But unless and until there is broader language, further clarification, or appellate action, some of the same practical questions remain.
Dealers should still be careful about assuming that a successful background check answers every possible question under the new law or under separate statutes such as Virginia’s firearms industry liability law. The injunction may prevent the named defendant from enforcing the challenged provisions, but that is not the same thing as a blanket guarantee that no other enforcement risk exists.
For pending transfers or approvals that began before July 1, my advice remains the same: do not immediately panic, return firearms to manufacturers, cancel transactions, or unwind transfers solely because of the current uncertainty. If the customer is willing to wait while the orders and any appeal activity become clearer, waiting may preserve options. Canceling immediately may unnecessarily destroy them.
This remains a developing situation. The Lancaster County order is a major victory as was the subsequent Washington County injunction, but the exact language matters. Gun owners, purchasers, and FFLs should read the order itself and avoid relying solely on social-media descriptions of its scope.
I will continue to monitor the Lancaster County case, the Washington County case, and any appeal or stay activity.
