Status of Firearm Related Bills in the 2026 Legislative Session

Virginia Under Siege

Several anti-civil rights bills are awaiting the Governor’s signature (or to go into effect is she fails to act on them in 30 days) and both gun owners and the firearms industry are facing an uncertain future in Virginia.

For a complete list of all bills impacting gun owners and the firearms industry and what their current status is, please see the Bill Tracker I maintain for the Virginia Citizens Defense League (VCDL) and sign up for the VA-ALERT email updates.

I have started to do detailed articles about the bills that are generating the most concern and the following shortcuts will take you to each of those detailed articles:

Posted in 2A, AR-15, Assault Firearms, Concealed Handgun Permit, FFL Issues, Magazine Capacity, Second Amendment, Suppressors, Virginia Concealed Handgun Permit, Virginia Law, Virginia Politics | Comments Off on Status of Firearm Related Bills in the 2026 Legislative Session

Understanding the August 5th ruling in the Silencer Shop Foundation v. BATFE case

Federal Court Rules Key NFA Registration Requirements Unconstitutional—What the Decision Actually Changes

Last updated August 5, 2026.

Executive Summary

On August 5, 2026, a federal district court in Texas held that major portions of the National Firearms Act’s registration and advance-approval system are unconstitutional as applied to suppressors, short-barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns, and firearms classified as “any other weapons.” The court reasoned that Congress originally enacted those requirements to support the collection of NFA taxes, but Congress reduced the relevant making and transfer taxes to $0 effective January 1, 2026.

The decision is extremely significant, but it does not immediately eliminate NFA registration for everyone.

  • The ruling is temporarily stayed. The district court stayed its injunction for seven days to give the federal government an opportunity to seek appellate relief. Unless another court extends the stay, the injunction should become operative after August 12, 2026—effectively August 13.
  • The injunction is not nationwide. It protects the named plaintiffs and, where applicable, their current and future members, agencies, political subdivisions, and customers.
  • Virginia residents are not protected merely because they live in Virginia. Virginia was not one of the fifteen plaintiff states. A Virginia resident may nevertheless qualify through membership in one of the plaintiff associations or through a covered transaction with a protected business.
  • Machineguns and destructive devices remain subject to the NFA taxes and regulatory system.
  • The Gun Control Act, prohibited-person laws, federal dealer requirements, and state and local firearms laws remain in effect.
  • An appeal is expected. A Fifth Circuit stay could prevent the injunction from taking effect or suspend it while the appeal proceeds.

Practical bottom line: No person should manufacture, transfer, receive, or possess an unregistered NFA firearm based solely on a headline about this decision. Whether the injunction protects a particular person, trust, business, firearm, or transaction requires a careful analysis of the final judgment, association membership, the current status of the stay, and all other applicable federal and state laws.

The Cases and the Court’s Decision

The decision was issued by United States District Judge James Wesley Hendrix in Silencer Shop Foundation v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, No. 6:25-CV-056-H, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The court had consolidated that case with a substantially similar action, Jensen v. ATF.

The plaintiffs included individual gun owners, firearms manufacturers and dealers, firearms-rights organizations, and fifteen states. They challenged the NFA provisions requiring federal applications, advance ATF approval, registration, and proof of registration before a person may make, transfer, receive, or possess specified NFA firearms.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their Article I enumerated-powers claim. It held that the challenged provisions exceed the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution. The court did not decide the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment claims.

The full Memorandum Opinion and Order is 66 pages. The separately entered Final Judgment identifies the specific statutory and regulatory provisions covered by the injunction.

Why the Court Found the NFA Provisions Unconstitutional

1. The NFA was enacted as a tax measure

Congress enacted the National Firearms Act in 1934 using its constitutional power to impose and collect taxes. The statute imposed taxes on the making and transfer of specified firearms and created an extensive application, registration, reporting, and recordkeeping system to assist in collecting and enforcing those taxes.

In 1937, the United States Supreme Court upheld the NFA as a taxing measure in Sonzinsky v. United States. Later decisions similarly described the NFA as an interrelated system for taxing particular classes of firearms.

2. Congress reduced the relevant taxes to zero

In the One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025, Congress reduced the NFA making and transfer taxes to $0 for four categories of firearms:

  • Suppressors or silencers;
  • Short-barreled rifles;
  • Short-barreled shotguns; and
  • Firearms classified as “any other weapons,” commonly called AOWs.

The change took effect January 1, 2026. Congress did not eliminate the $200 making and transfer taxes for machineguns and destructive devices. It also retained the annual special occupational tax paid by NFA manufacturers, importers, and dealers.

Relying principally on the Supreme Court’s taxing-power analysis in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the district court reasoned that an essential feature of a tax is that it produces at least some revenue. A tax set at $0 produces none.

Because the challenged registration and approval provisions were enacted to assist in collecting the now-zeroed making and transfer taxes, the court concluded that those provisions no longer have a valid constitutional foundation under the Taxing Clause.

3. The remaining occupational tax did not save the system

The federal government argued that the application and registration system still helps ATF identify people who are operating as unlicensed NFA manufacturers or dealers and evading the remaining occupational tax.

The court rejected that argument. It found that the occupational tax has its own registration and enforcement provisions and is legally distinct from the making and transfer taxes. The court also found that the government’s evidence demonstrated only a very limited relationship between the challenged registration system and enforcement of the occupational tax.

The court therefore held that the challenged requirements were not sufficiently connected to the occupational tax to be sustained under either the Taxing Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause.

4. The government could not retroactively rely on the Commerce Clause

The government alternatively argued that Congress has broad authority to regulate firearms moving in interstate commerce and that the NFA provisions could be sustained under the Commerce Clause.

The court did not hold that Congress necessarily lacks Commerce Clause authority to regulate every transaction involving these firearms. Instead, it held that Congress enacted the challenged NFA provisions under its taxing power—not its commerce power—and that the government could not save the provisions through a constitutional justification Congress did not employ.

The court emphasized that:

  • The NFA is codified in Title 26, the Internal Revenue Code;
  • Its text repeatedly speaks in terms of taxation;
  • The challenged provisions generally lack an interstate-commerce jurisdictional element;
  • Other NFA provisions expressly refer to interstate commerce or importation, demonstrating that Congress knew how to include such language; and
  • The Gun Control Act, codified separately in Title 18, expressly relies on interstate-commerce connections.

This aspect of the opinion is likely to receive close appellate scrutiny. Earlier Fifth Circuit opinions contain language suggesting that the NFA may be supported by the Commerce Clause. Judge Hendrix concluded that this language was dicta, conflicted with earlier Fifth Circuit authority, and did not apply the framework subsequently established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison.

What the Court Did Not Decide

The plaintiffs also argued that the challenged NFA provisions violate the Second Amendment. At oral argument, however, the plaintiffs agreed that the court could avoid deciding those claims if it granted equivalent relief under Article I.

The court accordingly dismissed the Second Amendment claims without prejudice as abandoned. The decision does not determine:

  • Whether suppressors are constitutionally protected “arms”;
  • Whether short-barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns, or AOWs are protected by the Second Amendment;
  • Whether the NFA registration system is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation; or
  • Whether any of these items are properly classified as “dangerous and unusual.”

Those issues remain available for future litigation, particularly if the Article I ruling is reversed on appeal.

When Does the Injunction Take Effect?

The final judgment was entered on August 5, 2026, but the district court stayed its effect for seven days to allow the federal defendants to seek relief at the appellate level.

Under ordinary federal time-counting principles, August 12 is the seventh day following entry. Unless the district court or the Fifth Circuit enters another stay, the injunction should become operative after August 12—effectively August 13, 2026.

An appeal does not automatically stay an injunction. The government must obtain a stay from the district court or the Fifth Circuit. If an appellate stay is granted, the existing NFA procedures could remain enforceable against everyone while the appeal proceeds.

As of the time of this update on August 5, 2026, the publicly available materials reflected the district court’s seven-day stay but no subsequent appellate stay. Because that could change quickly, the procedural status should be confirmed before anyone relies on the injunction.

Who Is Protected by the Injunction?

The court held the challenged provisions unconstitutional on their face, but it refused to issue a universal injunction protecting everyone in the country. Relying on the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Trump v. CASA, the court limited relief to the parties before it and persons or entities sufficiently connected to those parties.

The Silencer Shop Foundation plaintiffs

The lead-case plaintiffs include:

  • Brady Wetz;
  • Silencer Shop Foundation;
  • B&T USA, LLC;
  • Palmetto State Armory, LLC;
  • SilencerCo Weapons Research, LLC;
  • Gun Owners of America, Inc.;
  • Gun Owners Foundation;
  • Firearms Regulatory Accountability Coalition, Inc.; and
  • Fifteen plaintiff states.

The association-based protection extends to current and future members. The commercial protection extends to current and future customers, but the court limited customer protection to transactions involving a named commercial plaintiff or a commercial member of a plaintiff association.

The lead-case relief includes AOWs.

The Jensen plaintiffs

The consolidated Jensen plaintiffs include:

  • John Jensen;
  • Jeremy Neusch;
  • David Lynn Smith;
  • Hot Shots Custom, LLC;
  • Texas State Rifle Association;
  • FPC Action Foundation; and
  • Citizens Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms.

Their current and future members and qualifying customers are also protected. The Jensen plaintiffs obtained additional relief from the NFA’s individual-maker marking requirement and the associated prohibition on possessing an improperly marked firearm.

However, the Jensen plaintiffs failed to establish standing regarding AOWs. A person relying solely on Jensen-side membership therefore does not receive AOW protection from this injunction.

The fifteen plaintiff states

The state plaintiffs are Texas, Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

The injunction protects those state governments, their agencies, and their political subdivisions. It does not protect every person who resides in one of those states.

Who Is Not Protected?

The injunction does not protect:

  • Members of the general public who are not named plaintiffs, qualifying association members, or customers in covered transactions;
  • A resident of a plaintiff state merely because of residency;
  • Association supporters or donors who are not actual members;
  • Spouses, children, or other household members unless they independently qualify;
  • A trust, corporation, or LLC merely because a trustee, owner, beneficiary, or officer is personally a member;
  • Customers engaging in unrelated NFA activities outside a covered commercial transaction;
  • Jensen-only plaintiffs or members with respect to AOWs; or
  • Anyone dealing with a machinegun or destructive device.

The treatment of trusts is especially important. Many suppressors and other NFA firearms are owned by trusts. Because a trust may be the legal applicant, transferee, registrant, and possessor, an individual trustee’s association membership should not automatically be assumed to protect the trust.

Which NFA Provisions Are Enjoined?

For covered persons and transactions, the common injunction reaches:

  • 26 U.S.C. § 5812(a)–(b), governing applications and approval for transfers;
  • 26 U.S.C. § 5822, governing applications and approval for making;
  • 26 U.S.C. § 5841(a)–(c) and (e), governing portions of the registration system and proof of registration;
  • 26 U.S.C. § 5861(b)–(f), establishing offenses involving firearms transferred or made in violation of the NFA and possession of an unregistered firearm;
  • 27 C.F.R. § 479.62(a)–(d), principally implementing the Form 1 making requirement; and
  • 27 C.F.R. § 479.84(a)–(d), principally implementing the Form 4 transfer requirement.

The Jensen plaintiffs also obtained protection from 26 U.S.C. § 5842(b), governing the marking of firearms made by persons other than manufacturers or importers, and § 5861(i), addressing possession of a firearm not identified by the required serial number.

Important Laws That Remain in Effect

The decision does not repeal the NFA and does not remove silencers or short-barreled firearms from every form of federal regulation.

Among other things, the ruling does not disturb:

  • The NFA making and transfer taxes applicable to machineguns and destructive devices;
  • The special occupational tax and registration requirements for NFA manufacturers, importers, and dealers;
  • The federal Gun Control Act;
  • Federal firearms-license requirements;
  • Form 4473, dealer recordkeeping, and NICS background-check requirements when independently applicable;
  • The federal prohibition on possession by prohibited persons;
  • State and local prohibitions and restrictions; and
  • NFA provisions addressing conduct not included in the final judgment.

One particularly important example is 26 U.S.C. § 5861(j), which addresses interstate transportation, delivery, or receipt of an unregistered NFA firearm. That provision was not included in the injunction. A protected person should not assume that the decision authorizes unrestricted interstate transportation of an unregistered firearm.

What the Decision Means for Virginia Residents

Virginia was not one of the fifteen plaintiff states. A Virginia resident therefore receives no protection merely because he or she lives in Virginia.

A Virginia individual or business may nevertheless fall within the injunction through:

  • Current or future membership in one of the plaintiff associations;
  • Status as a customer in a transaction with a named commercial plaintiff; or
  • Status as a customer in a transaction with a commercial member of one of the plaintiff associations.

That does not end the analysis. Virginia law remains fully applicable, as do federal firearms laws outside the injunction. Additional complications may arise where the proposed owner is a trust or LLC, another household member will possess the firearm, the firearm will cross state lines, or the transaction passes through several manufacturers, distributors, and dealers.

Before changing existing NFA compliance practices, a Virginia owner, dealer, or manufacturer should confirm:

  1. That the seven-day stay has expired and no appellate stay has been entered;
  2. That the actual legal person acquiring, making, or possessing the firearm is protected;
  3. That the firearm falls within a category covered for that particular plaintiff group;
  4. That the contemplated conduct does not implicate an un-enjoined NFA provision;
  5. That all Gun Control Act requirements are satisfied; and
  6. That the conduct complies with Virginia and any applicable local law.

Practical Effects if the Injunction Takes Effect

For qualifying individuals

A qualifying plaintiff or association member could potentially make, receive, and possess a covered suppressor, SBR, SBS, or AOW without complying with the specific Form 1, Form 4, approval, and registration provisions enjoined by the court.

However, protection may depend on which plaintiff organization supplies coverage. For example, Jensen-only members do not receive AOW relief, while lead-case plaintiffs did not obtain the additional injunction against the individual-maker marking provisions.

For dealers, manufacturers, and the suppressor industry

Covered businesses may be able to complete qualifying transactions without waiting for Form 4 approval. This could dramatically reduce delivery times and increase demand.

At the same time, the decision could produce a fragmented market in which:

  • Some buyers and sellers are protected while others are not;
  • Businesses must verify and document association membership;
  • Different firearm categories receive different treatment;
  • Manufacturers, distributors, local dealers, and end consumers may have different relationships to the protected commercial plaintiff; and
  • Conservative dealers continue using the existing process until ATF or the appellate courts provide guidance.

For ATF and the federal courts

ATF may need to operate a two-track system: one for protected parties and transactions and another for everyone else. Federal courts may then have to decide whether a particular defendant was a member or customer, whether the relevant trust or business was protected, whether the firearm was part of a covered transaction, and whether the charged conduct falls within an enjoined subsection.

The judgment does not require ATF to delete existing NFRTR records, cancel pending applications, redesign eForms, refund previously paid taxes, or vacate earlier convictions.

Questions Likely to Be Addressed on Appeal

The most important unresolved issues include:

  1. Whether the NFA can be sustained under the Commerce Clause. The Fifth Circuit may disagree with the district court’s conclusion that Congress did not sufficiently invoke that power.
  2. Whether prior Fifth Circuit precedent controls. The government is likely to rely heavily on United States v. Ardoin and related decisions.
  3. Whether the registration system sufficiently assists the remaining occupational tax.
  4. Whether future association members may obtain the benefit of an injunction entered before they joined.
  5. How customer protection applies to downstream commercial chains. Many suppressors travel from manufacturer to distributor to local dealer before reaching the consumer.
  6. Whether an individual’s membership protects a separately existing trust or LLC.
  7. Whether un-enjoined provisions, such as the interstate-transportation offense, remain enforceable when registration itself cannot be required of a protected person.
  8. How state statutes incorporating federal registration or federal-law compliance should operate.

Congress could also respond by restoring a nominal nonzero tax, expressly reenacting the regulatory system under the Commerce Clause, or substantially rewriting the NFA. Any such response would likely produce additional litigation.

Conclusion

The district court’s decision is one of the most consequential NFA rulings since the statute was enacted in 1934. It holds that Congress cannot continue using its taxing power to require federal registration and advance approval for suppressors, short-barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns, and AOWs after reducing the relevant taxes to zero.

Nevertheless, the practical effect is currently limited. The injunction is temporarily stayed, does not protect the public at large, does not apply uniformly to every plaintiff group or firearm category, and does not displace the Gun Control Act or state law.

For now, the safest plain-English description is this: The court declared the core NFA registration system unconstitutional for the four untaxed categories, but only specifically protected parties may rely on the injunction—and no one may rely on it while the stay remains in effect.

If you have questions about how this decision affects a particular firearm, trust, business, transfer, or proposed manufacture, contact our office for an individualized review before taking action.


This article is provided for general informational purposes only. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. The status and effect of the decision may change rapidly through appellate proceedings.

Posted in 2A, 5th Circuit, AOW, ATF, BATFE, Court Rulings, Federal Court, Federal Law, Fifth Circuit, Firearms Industry, Injunctions, Machine Guns, NFA Transfers, SBR, SBS, Second Amendment, Short Barreled Rifles, Short Barreled Shotguns | Comments Off on Understanding the August 5th ruling in the Silencer Shop Foundation v. BATFE case

New Jersey’s Gun Ban Falls—and Virginia’s New Jersey-Style Law Is Enjoined Statewide

On July 17, 2026, the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit struck down New Jersey’s ban on commonly owned semiautomatic rifles and its restrictions on magazines holding more than ten rounds. Four days later, on July 21, a Virginia state-court injunction is scheduled to take statewide effect against Virginia’s own recently enacted restrictions on so-called “assault firearms” and magazines.

The timing is remarkable. So is the political connection. Governor Abigail Spanberger, who signed Virginia’s law, was born in Red Bank, New Jersey. Delegate Dan Helmer, the chief House patron of HB 217 and a longtime advocate of an “assault weapons” ban, was born in New Brunswick, New Jersey. Under their leadership, Virginia adopted the same basic regulatory theory New Jersey has pursued for decades: government may place an entire class of commonly owned semiautomatic firearms beyond the reach of ordinary citizens because legislators disapprove of certain features, capacities, or appearances.

The Virginia statute is not a word-for-word copy of New Jersey’s law, and birthplace does not prove motive. But the policy resemblance is unmistakable. In our view, Richmond imported a New Jersey-style citizen-control model—and two courts, one federal and one state, have now delivered powerful reasons to doubt that model’s constitutionality.

The Third Circuit’s Message: Commonly Owned Rifles Cannot Be Banned

The case is Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney General of New Jersey, Nos. 24-2415, 24-2450, and 24-2506 (3d Cir. July 17, 2026). Applying the Supreme Court’s decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, United States v. Rahimi, and Wolford v. Lopez, the Third Circuit held that New Jersey’s semiautomatic-rifle and magazine restrictions violate the Second Amendment.

The court began with constitutional text. Semiautomatic rifles are bearable “Arms.” They do not lose that status because they are modern, powerful, derived from a military design, or rarely fired in self-defense. The record showed approximately 24 million AR-15s and similar rifles in circulation, owned for lawful purposes that include self-defense, hunting, target shooting, and pest control.

That widespread lawful ownership mattered at the historical stage of the Bruen analysis. New Jersey had the burden to identify a representative historical tradition supporting its modern prohibition. It could not do so. Fire-safety restrictions on gunpowder, laws regulating concealed carry, and penalties for criminal misuse were not valid analogues for a near-total ban on possession by peaceable citizens.

The court therefore held New Jersey’s law unconstitutional as applied to the full class of covered semiautomatic rifles—not merely one Colt AR-15 model. It summarized the governing principle in direct terms: “bans or broad prohibitions” on possessing or carrying a class of weapons in common lawful use lack support in the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court likewise rejected New Jersey’s magazine restrictions, observing that more than 100 million thirty-round AR-15 magazines were in circulation and that constitutionally protected capacity “surely is not ten.” Read the Third Circuit’s complete opinion.

The practical effect is a major Second Amendment victory, although affected New Jersey residents should still account for the appellate mandate, any request for a stay, and proceedings on remand before treating a particular transaction as lawful.

From New Jersey to Richmond

Virginia’s political sponsors adopted a strikingly familiar playbook. The official legislative record identifies Delegate Helmer as the chief patron of HB 217. Governor Spanberger championed the policy, acted on the legislation, and supplied the executive signature that made it law. See the HB 217 legislative history and the SB 749 legislative history.

The New Jersey connection is a matter of public record. The U.S. House Historian lists Spanberger’s birthplace as Red Bank, New Jersey, although she moved to Virginia as a teenager and graduated from a Henrico County public school. The Virginia Public Access Project lists New Jersey as Helmer’s birth state. See Spanberger’s official congressional biography and Helmer’s VPAP profile.

Those biographical facts are not a legal argument. They are politically relevant because the law they promoted follows New Jersey’s approach so closely. Both schemes:

  • apply the politically created label “assault firearm” to semiautomatic rifles that fire one round per trigger pull;
  • target AR-15-platform rifles and other firearms based substantially on listed features;
  • identify features such as folding or telescoping stocks, conspicuous pistol grips, threaded barrels, forward grips, and grenade-launcher attachments;
  • pair firearm restrictions with limits on commonly owned ammunition magazines;
  • impose criminal penalties on transactions or possession involving covered arms; and
  • create exceptions for government personnel and selected institutional users while restricting ordinary citizens.

There are meaningful differences. New Jersey’s law generally barred possession and capped magazines at ten rounds. Virginia generally leaves existing possession untouched but criminalizes future importation, sale, manufacture, purchase, and transfer of covered firearms; its separate magazine restriction applies above fifteen rounds. Virginia also uses its own feature definitions and exceptions. Those differences may affect particular claims, but they do not change the shared premise: the government selects a class of commonly owned semiautomatic arms and prevents the next generation of ordinary citizens from acquiring them.

That is why “gun control” is too mild a description. The firearm does not commit a crime, and the law does not require proof that its owner is dangerous. The state controls the citizen’s access to an ordinary arm because of what someone else might do. That is citizen control dressed in the language of public safety.

Governor Spanberger made that choice explicit when she signed HB 217 and SB 749, stating that firearms “designed to inflict maximum casualties do not belong on our streets.” But constitutional rights do not depend on whether an elected official approves of the protected item. Bruen instructs courts to apply text, history, and tradition—not a legislative judgment that a commonly owned arm is too dangerous for the public. Read the Governor’s signing announcement.

Virginia’s Statewide Injunction Takes Effect July 21

Virginia’s law became effective July 1, 2026, but it immediately faced multiple challenges. The most consequential ruling came in Santolla v. Katz in the Washington County Circuit Court.

On June 29, Judge Jeffrey Campbell found that the challengers were likely to succeed under Article I, Section 13 of the Virginia Constitution. The court treated Bruen as persuasive and concluded that the Commonwealth had not produced a sufficient historical analogue for the bans. On July 7, the court clarified that its preliminary injunction applies statewide to Virginia and local law-enforcement agencies, covered officers, and Commonwealth’s Attorneys. The court delayed the statewide onset until July 21 to permit notice to enforcement officials. Read the June 29 opinion and the July 7 statewide ruling.

Unless a higher court stays or modifies that order, statewide enforcement of the challenged firearm and magazine provisions will be enjoined beginning July 21. That protection is preliminary, not a final declaration that the laws are permanently void. Appeals and further proceedings remain possible. A Lancaster County court has separately enjoined the Superintendent of the Virginia State Police, while a Spotsylvania County court denied preliminary relief in another case.

There is also now a federal challenge filed by the United States Department of Justice. The July 21 statewide injunction, however, is a Virginia state-court order grounded principally in Virginia’s own constitutional right to keep and bear arms.

Why the New Jersey Decision Matters in Virginia

The Third Circuit’s decision does not bind Virginia. The Third Circuit governs federal courts in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and the Virgin Islands. Virginia lies within the Fourth Circuit, whose en banc decision in Bianchi v. Brown upheld Maryland’s similar rifle ban.

The present statewide injunction also comes from a Virginia circuit court construing Article I, Section 13—not from a federal court applying Third Circuit precedent. The New Jersey decision is therefore persuasive authority in the Virginia state litigation, not controlling authority.

But persuasive authority can be powerful, especially when it is this close factually. The Third Circuit rejected the same central theory Virginia advances: that government can remove commonly owned semiautomatic rifles from ordinary civilian commerce by calling them “assault firearms” and pointing to historical laws that regulated different conduct for different reasons. Its analysis gives Virginia challengers a detailed, en banc roadmap for defending the Washington County court’s conclusion.

The Supreme Court Will Supply the Nationwide Answer

One development is confirmed, not predicted: on June 30, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in Viramontes v. Cook County, No. 25-238, and Grant v. Higgins, No. 25-566. The cases ask whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to possess AR-15-platform and similar semiautomatic rifles. See the official question presented and the consolidated docket.

The informed forecast is that the Court will hear argument during its 2026–2027 Term and decide the cases by June 2027. If the Court adopts the Third Circuit’s reasoning, Virginia’s attempt to close future civilian commerce in these rifles will face grave federal constitutional jeopardy. Magazine restrictions could require separate analysis unless the Court writes broadly enough to resolve that question too.

The Bottom Line

New Jersey spent decades treating ordinary citizens as unfit to possess rifles and magazines owned by millions of Americans. The Third Circuit has now held that approach incompatible with the Second Amendment. Virginia’s leadership chose the same basic model, and Virginia courts had already begun stopping it before the Third Circuit ruled.

Governor Spanberger and Delegate Helmer may both have been born in New Jersey, but Virginia is not New Jersey. Beginning July 21, the Commonwealth’s New Jersey-style restrictions are scheduled to be enjoined statewide. The final word will come through continued state litigation and, ultimately, a Supreme Court decision that will bind both states.

This article provides general legal information based on authorities available through July 20, 2026. It is not individualized legal advice. Because stays, appeals, and amended orders can change the enforceability of a statute quickly, gun owners and dealers should confirm the current status before completing a transaction involving a covered firearm or magazine.

Posted in 2A, 3rd Circuit, AR Pistols, AR-15, Assault Firearms, Court Rulings, Federal Court, Injunctions, Second Amendment, US Supreme Court, Virginia Courts, Virginia Law, Virginia Politics, Virginia Supreme Court | Comments Off on New Jersey’s Gun Ban Falls—and Virginia’s New Jersey-Style Law Is Enjoined Statewide

Breaking: Washington County Court Expands SB 749 Injunction Statewide Effective July 21

A Washington County Circuit Court judge has issued a major clarification in the pending challenge to Virginia’s new “assault firearm” and “large capacity magazine” restrictions, commonly referred to as SB 749.

In a July 7, 2026 letter opinion in Santolla, et al. v. Katz, et al., Judge Jeffrey L. Campbell announced that the preliminary injunction previously entered in the case will not merely protect the named plaintiffs or apply only to the named defendants. Instead, the injunction will be extended to apply statewide.

The injunction is now set to take effect on July 21, 2026.

What Changed?

The parties disagreed over the language of the proposed order following the court’s prior ruling. The plaintiffs sought an order with universal, statewide application. The Commonwealth argued that the injunction should be limited only to the named defendants in the case.

Judge Campbell recognized that Virginia courts generally disfavor injunctions against non-parties. However, the court also noted that the facts of this case created a unique problem: a limited injunction could create a dangerous and confusing patchwork of enforcement across Virginia.

The court gave a practical example. A person might be able to lawfully transport an AR-15 through Washington County under the protection of the injunction, but then face potential prosecution the moment he crossed into another county, such as Grayson County, if the injunction did not follow him statewide.

The court described this as a “treacherous patchwork of enforcement” that could create uncertainty for both gun owners and law enforcement.

The Injunction Will Apply Across Virginia

Judge Campbell concluded that partial relief would not be enough to protect the plaintiffs from irreparable harm. As a result, the court found that the injunction should be expanded to statewide application.

According to the letter opinion, the injunction will apply to:

  • Law enforcement agencies of the Commonwealth;
  • Local law enforcement agencies;
  • Law enforcement officers as defined in Virginia Code § 9.1-101; and
  • Commonwealth’s Attorneys throughout Virginia.

In plain English, this means that, beginning July 21, the injunction is intended to prevent enforcement of the challenged SB 749 restrictions across the entire Commonwealth, not just in Washington County and not just against the named defendants.

Why July 21?

The court did not make the statewide injunction immediate. Instead, Judge Campbell amended the effective date to July 21, 2026 so that notice can be delivered to law enforcement and Commonwealth’s Attorneys throughout Virginia.

The court directed the Clerk to provide a certified copy of the order granting the injunction to law enforcement officers and Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Offices across the Commonwealth.

In one of the more memorable lines from the letter, the court observed that one would think a person would have to be “living under a rock” not to be aware of these proceedings, but still recognized that reasonable notice should be given before the injunction takes effect statewide.

Why This Matters for Virginia Gun Owners

This is a significant development for Virginia gun owners, firearms dealers, and anyone attempting to understand the rapidly changing legal landscape surrounding SB 749.

The court’s ruling addresses one of the biggest unresolved concerns after the initial injunction: whether a person could still face prosecution outside the limited territory or parties covered by the original order.

The July 7 letter strongly suggests that the court intends to prevent exactly that kind of county-by-county legal minefield.

Once the statewide injunction takes effect, the challenged restrictions should not be enforced anywhere in Virginia while the injunction remains in place, unless an appellate court stays, modifies, or reverses the order.

Important Caution

This does not mean the case is over. The injunction is preliminary, and the litigation will continue. The Commonwealth may seek appellate review, request a stay, or otherwise challenge the scope of the injunction.

Gun owners and dealers should also remember that the injunction applies only to the challenged Virginia restrictions. Federal law still applies, including all NFA, ATF, background check, prohibited person, interstate transfer, and dealer requirements.

Bottom Line

The Washington County Circuit Court has now made clear that the SB 749 injunction is intended to go truly statewide.

Unless changed by a higher court, the injunction will take effect across Virginia on July 21, 2026, barring enforcement of the challenged “assault firearm” and “large capacity magazine” bans by Virginia law enforcement and Commonwealth’s Attorneys statewide.

This is one of the most important developments yet in the SB 749 litigation, and it should prevent the kind of confusing, county-by-county enforcement nightmare that many Virginia gun owners feared.

Download (PDF, 140KB)

Posted in 2A, Assault Firearms, Court Rulings, Injunctions, Virginia Courts, Virginia Law, Virginia Politics, Virginia State Police | Comments Off on Breaking: Washington County Court Expands SB 749 Injunction Statewide Effective July 21

A deep dive into Virginia’s new record sealing Law

If you’ve been carrying the weight of an old charge or conviction, Virginia’s new record‑sealing law—which took effect July 1, 2026—may finally give you room to breathe again.

For many people, this law creates a real chance to move forward without a past mistake showing up every time they apply for a job, housing, or volunteer opportunity.

Some records will seal automatically behind the scenes, while others require a petition to the court, but both paths are designed to help people rebuild their lives. At the same time, the law has very specific rules about who qualifies, who doesn’t, and what needs to be checked before applying.

Understanding those details is the first step toward figuring out whether sealing is possible for you—and toward taking back control of your future.  So let’s dive into the details:

1. What “Sealing” Means (Va. Code § 19.2‑392.5)

Sealing prohibits public access to criminal history records and court records held by:

  • The Central Criminal Records Exchange (CCRE)
  • Courts
  • Police / Sheriff / Campus Police
  • DMV

Two key lines from the statute:

“Sealing means to prohibit public access to records relating to an arrest, charge, or conviction…” “Any law-enforcement agency shall reply…that no record exists with respect to an arrest, charge, or conviction that has been sealed…”

Sealed records can still be shared internally between government agencies and federal agencies for legally required purposes.

2. Who the Law Applies To

  • Adults arrested, charged, or convicted.
  • Juveniles tried in circuit court under § 16.1‑269.1.

3. Types of Sealing Available

A. Automatic Sealing (No Petition Required)

Automatic sealing applies to:

  • Acquittals, nolle prosequi, dismissals (misdemeanors)
  • Certain misdemeanor convictions if the person has no other convictions and meets strict criteria
  • Certain marijuana offenses (under other sections not included in this excerpt)

Automatic sealing is triggered by:

  • Court clerks sending electronic notifications
  • State Police updating CCRE
  • Annual or monthly automated review cycles

B. Sealing by Petition (Va. Code § 19.2‑392.12 & § 19.2‑392.12:1)

Petition-based sealing applies to:

  • Misdemeanors
  • Class 5 or 6 felonies
  • Felony larceny offenses punished under § 18.2‑95
  • Certain listed misdemeanors (trespass, petty larceny, disorderly conduct, etc.)
  • Ancillary matters (FTA, contempt, probation violations) if tied to the same event

Petitioners must meet all six criteria in § 19.2‑392.12(F), including:

  • No serious felony history
  • 7–10 years crime‑free period
  • Rehabilitation if substance‑related
  • Restitution paid
  • No more than two prior sealing petitions granted
  • Showing “manifest injustice” if the record remains public

4. Who Is Not Eligible (Ineligible Offenses List — § 19.2‑392.12(L))

This is one of the most important parts for your website visitors.

A. Entire categories of offenses are excluded, including:

  • DUI (§ 18.2‑266)
  • Domestic assault (§ 18.2‑57.2)
  • Hate crimes (§ 52‑8.5)
  • Sex offenses (Articles 7, 3, 4, 5 of Title 18.2, except narrow exceptions)
  • Violent felonies under § 17.1‑805(C)
  • Any offense requiring sex offender registration
  • Animal cruelty (Article 9 of Title 3.2)
  • Election offenses (Title 24.2)
  • Dangerous/vicious dog offenses
  • Offenses involving GHB or flunitrazepam
  • Offenses where the victim was a family or household member
  • Violations of protective orders
  • Felonies involving firearm use, unless firearm rights have been restored

B. Procedural ineligibility

A person is also ineligible if:

  • They already had two petitions granted in their lifetime
  • The offenses arise from different transactions (petitions can only cover one event)
  • They have unpaid restitution
  • They have recent convictions within the 7–10 year lookback period

5. What Sealing Does Not Do

Even after sealing:

  • It does not restore firearm rights
  • It does not restore civil rights
  • It does not erase restitution obligations
  • It does not prevent use of sealed records in:
    • Bail hearings
    • Sentencing
    • Pretrial reports
    • Child custody cases

Statutory line:

“An order to seal…shall not serve to restore a person’s civil rights or a person’s right to possess…a firearm…”

6. When Applicants Must Still Disclose Sealed Records

Disclosure is still required when:

  • Applying to law enforcement agencies
  • Required by state or federal law
  • Required for national security positions
  • Allowed under rules adopted under §§ 9.1‑128 and 9.1‑134
  • Serving on a jury (felony convictions only)
  • In child custody proceedings

7. What Applicants Should Check Before Filing

A. Check your criminal history for:

  • Conviction type (misdemeanor vs. felony)
  • Offense date (must be after Jan. 1, 1986)
  • Whether the offense is on the ineligible list
  • Whether multiple charges arose from the same event
  • Whether restitution is fully paid
  • Whether you have two prior sealing petitions
  • Whether you have any convictions in the last 7–10 years
  • Whether the offense involved a firearm
  • Whether the victim was a family/household member

B. Check your court records for:

  • Case numbers
  • Final disposition dates
  • Arresting agency
  • Whether any ancillary matters exist (FTA, contempt, probation violations)

C. Check your CCRE record for:

  • State Identification Number (SID)
  • Whether prior offenses were already sealed
  • Whether the record shows any disqualifying convictions

The following infographic shows the various paths in a more readable format.

Posted in Expungement, Record Sealing, Virginia Courts, Virginia Law, Virginia Politics, Virginia State Police | Comments Off on A deep dive into Virginia’s new record sealing Law

Update: Lancaster County Final Injunction Order Released, But Scope Remains Limited

We now have a copy of the final injunction order entered in the Lancaster County challenge to Virginia’s new “assault firearm” and magazine ban. I will embed a copy of the order below so readers can review the exact language for themselves.

The important point is that the order appears to follow the same basic structure as the court’s earlier ruling. It grants preliminary injunctive relief, but it does so by enjoining the defendant in the case: Colonel Jeffrey S. Katz, in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Virginia State Police, along with his successors, officers, agents, servants, and employees.

That is a significant victory. But it is still important not to overread the impact of this first step.

The order does not appear to be written as a universal injunction against every possible enforcement actor in Virginia. It does not expressly enjoin every Commonwealth’s Attorney, every local law-enforcement agency, every locality, or every possible civil-enforcement theory. Instead, it restrains the named defendant and those legally acting through him.

Why this matters

An injunction against the Superintendent of the Virginia State Police can have major statewide practical effect because the Virginia State Police administer the firearm background-check process. If the State Police cannot enforce the challenged provisions through that process, that is enormously important for purchasers and FFLs across the Commonwealth.

But that is not the same thing as saying every possible legal issue has been resolved.

The order enjoins enforcement of several listed provisions, including the new “assault firearm” restrictions, related disqualification provisions, certain public-carry provisions incorporating the amended definition (which had already been put on hold for a year), and related forfeiture provisions. It also provides that the prior versions of the definition of “assault firearm” and the public-carry statute remain in effect during the pendency of the preliminary injunction.

The order is effective from its entry date, June 30, 2026, until December 31, 2026, unless it is dissolved, stayed, modified, or extended by the court or another court of competent jurisdiction. The court also denied the defendant’s oral motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal.

For FFLs and purchasers, the practical takeaway is this: the order is very helpful and gives us great hope that this unconstitutional law will ultimately be struck down in its entirety. But unless and until there is broader language, further clarification, or appellate action, some of the same practical questions remain.

Dealers should still be careful about assuming that a successful background check answers every possible question under the new law or under separate statutes such as Virginia’s firearms industry liability law. The injunction may prevent the named defendant from enforcing the challenged provisions, but that is not the same thing as a blanket guarantee that no other enforcement risk exists.

For pending transfers or approvals that began before July 1, my advice remains the same: do not immediately panic, return firearms to manufacturers, cancel transactions, or unwind transfers solely because of the current uncertainty. If the customer is willing to wait while the orders and any appeal activity become clearer, waiting may preserve options. Canceling immediately may unnecessarily destroy them.

This remains a developing situation. The Lancaster County order is a major victory as was the subsequent Washington County injunction, but the exact language matters. Gun owners, purchasers, and FFLs should read the order itself and avoid relying solely on social-media descriptions of its scope.

I will continue to monitor the Lancaster County case, the Washington County case, and any appeal or stay activity.

Download (PDF, 163KB)

Posted in 2A, Assault Firearms, Civil Liability, Injunctions, Magazine Capacity, Second Amendment, Virginia Courts, Virginia Law, Virginia Politics, Virginia State Police | Comments Off on Update: Lancaster County Final Injunction Order Released, But Scope Remains Limited